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Abstract
This article analyses the spatial price differences in the rice market of the Mekong River Delta to assess the
impact of the liberalisation policies on its functioning. The results of these policies carried out during the last two
decades are impressive. The rice market system in the Delta is competitive. Price patterns strongly cohere and
are integrated with the regulated export prices. However, price patterns in other regions and in particular in the
North, are only weakly integrated with price patterns in the South. Private traders in the South satisfy local
demand and deal with State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) involved in exports and transactions with the North. In
the framework of the national food security policy, the state owned food companies subsidise transactions
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dramatic changes, the liberalisation process still faces major challenges.
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During the last decades the organisation of the Vietnamese rice market experienced some dramatic
changes. In 1975, after the devastating war and the reunification of the North and the South, several
attempts were made to introduce a collectivised agricultural production system in the South of
Vietnam. In line with these policies, wholesale private trade was prohibited and marketing parastatals
controlled the rice market. By 1980, Vietnam was facing large food deficits as a result of declining
productivity. In that year it produced only 73% of its food requirements (UNDP, 1989). Already in
1981 the agricultural policy switched to a more flexible contract system. However, more dramatic
changes were needed to improve the situation. During the last 20 years a series of reforms were
established to liberalise the domestic rice markets. The reforms in the agricultural sector were part of
the ‘Doi Moi’ (new way) economic policy. See Irving (1995) for a discussion of the impact of these
changes on the Vietnamese economy.
The institutional changes triggered rapid growth in the rice sector (Minot and Goletti, 2000). At
present Vietnam is a major rice exporter in the world market and in particular the surplus produced in
the Mekong River Delta is sold abroad. Between 1996 and 1999 on average 3 million tons of rice,
about 40% of total rice production in this region, were exported from the Mekong River Delta (VFA,
2000). Although rice exports are still controlled by parastatals (Khiem et al., 1995; Pingali et al, 1997;
VFA, 2001; Pohl-Nielsen, 2002), the transactions in the domestic rice market are completely
liberalised and private retailers, wholesalers and millers handle a major part of the domestic
marketable surplus. Large numbers of small-scale retailers and wholesalers are active in the market,
while a smaller group of private millers/wholesalers accumulated enough capital to deal with large-
scale transactions. The domestic rice market structure in the Mekong River Delta is characterised by
competition: no important entry barriers were observed, the degree of trader concentration is low, rice
products are marketed in a rather homogenous form and market information is relatively easy to obtain
(Luu T. Duc Hai, 2003). These factors indicate that the liberalisation policy has been successful and
facilitated the development of a competitive and integrated market. However, Minot and Goletti
(2000, p. xiii) observed that the degree of market integration remained weak. This raises the question
how integrated the market really is? To date no comprehensive studies of the market integration
process in the domestic rice-market of Vietnam are published. The importance of this staple food
market for the population and the short time lapse in which the dramatic changes in the organisation of
this market took place, further underline the relevance of this question.
In integrated markets an arbitrage process operates that limits price differences in time, form and
space, to the marketing costs. Spatial price behaviour in regional rice markets is an important indicator
of overall market performance. Markets that are not integrated may convey inaccurate price
information, distorting the marketing decisions of rice producers and contributing to inefficient
product movements (Tomek and Robinson, 1990). Sexton et al. (1991) identified three reasons for a
lack of market integration: prohibitive transaction costs, different kinds of trading barriers and
imperfect competition. Since the seminal paper of Harriss (1979) a large body of literature, dealing
with this topic, is published. Different methods were developed to analyse spatial price-differences
and to test for market integration (Ravallion, 1986; Alexander and Wyeth, 1994; Kuiper et al., 1999).
4Baulch (1997) criticises the conventional tests for market integration as transfer costs and non-
linearities implied by the spatial arbitrage conditions, were neglected in these models. Subsequently,
Abdulai (2000) showed that threshold cointegration tests could be used to accommodate this problem.
This article focuses on spatial price-differences in the rice market in Vietnam. Taking into account the
characteristics of the market under study, an empirical test is developed to verify whether price
patterns in different locations cohere. Price adjustment processes in the long and short-run are
distinguished. Two specific research questions are dealt with. First we want to examine whether the
degree of integration between the markets in the South and some markets at a larger distance (Central
Highlands, the North and the regulated Export Rice Price) differs? The relevance of this question
results from an observation made by Goletti and Minot (2000, p. 34) that price differences between the
South and the North were larger than would be expected on the basis of marketing costs. The second
question verifies whether evidence can be found in the price series for the expectation that the
regulated export price (the so-called ‘guidance export price’1) dominates the domestic price formation
process. As most of the marketable surplus in the Mekong River Delta is exported, this appears to be a
likely hypothesis.
The article is structured as follows. In the next Section a short overview is given of the reforms that
were carried out in the last two decades. This Section will shed some light on the dramatic changes
that have taken place in the organisation of the rice market. A good understanding of these changes
serves as a necessary background for the interpretation of the results. The third Section shows the
price series in 1998-2001 and focuses on the spatial price differences observed. Subsequently the
method is presented to test for market integration. In section 5 the results are discussed and finally
conclusions are drawn.
2. A chronological overview of major reforms in the agricultural sector in Vietnam
The period after 1975
By 1975, the year of unification with the South, nearly all northern rural households were members of
agricultural producers’ co-operatives, cultivating 95 percent of the arable land and producing 92
percent of total agricultural output. The government started the mobilisation campaign for the
“organisation of agricultural production towards socialist large-scale production” (Pingali and Xuan,
1992). Many co-operatives merged, thereby reducing the total number from over 40,000 co-operatives
to less than 20,000 co-operatives. However, in particular in the South, they did not meet expectations.
In Southern Vietnam production activities continued on a family farm basis and collective effort was
made only for obtaining inputs and marketing output. In general the failure of collectivisation can be
attributed to policies that disregarded producer incentives and disrupted market mechanisms for the
flow of inputs and outputs (Pingali and Xuan, 1992). The upshot was diseconomies, instead of
1 The Vietnamese government controls rice exports explicitly through a quota system and implicitly through the
fixing of a minimum export price. The Vietnamese Food Association sets these floor prices and rice exporters
are expected not to accept export contracts below this minimum (Pohl-Nielsen 2002).
5economies, of scale. In this period, local trade (retail) was allowed, while inter-regional trade
(wholesale) was monopolised by parastatals. The former private milling sector in the Mekong River
Delta was nationalised and replaced by state owned enterprises. Only some small-scale millers were
tolerated, but they operated under difficult circumstances.
The ‘contract system’ – 1981
In response to the disappointing results of the collectivisation policy, the contract system of production
was designed to improve producer incentives and, thereby, increase productivity. In this system,
individual households enter into a contract with the collective to produce a certain level of output on
their land. The contracted output had to be sold to the state for a fixed price. All output beyond the
contracted amount could be kept for home consumption or sold to private retailers. The organisation of
the rice market did not change in this period. Milling and wholesaling activities (inter-regional
transfers) were completely controlled by state owned companies.
Land allocation and privatisation of output markets -1988
A major reform took place by the promulgation of resolution number 10 in 1988 in the framework of
the ‘Doi Moi’ policy. It assigned land to individual households for 10-15-20 year’s on the basis of a
renewable lease. This improved the land rights of households and implied that farmers could not be
displaced without consent and a fair compensation for the cost of land development. Farmers were
also free to decide what to produce, how to produce and how to market their farm products. The role
of the co-operatives changed and was focused on the provision of services like irrigation management,
technical know-how transfer etc. Production teams were replaced by peasant households as basic units
of agricultural production. Farmers were no longer required to sell a quota to the State. Instead of this,
a commission had to be paid to the board of the collectives to pay for the delivered services, and taxes
were levied on the basis of the assessed value of their land. Private traders were given equal rights to
purchase rice from the farmers.
Rice market liberalisation after 1989
A number of changes were implemented in the framework of the liberalisation policy. The year 1989
is a landmark as some important initiatives were made:
Private rice traders were allowed to deliver paddy/rice out of the province. The checkpoints at the
border of the provinces were abolished.
The milling facilities, nationalised a decade before, were returned to the private owners who were
allowed to re-enter the milling business.
The Vietnamese Food Association (VFA) was established in 1989 in order to help and support both
state and private rice traders.
6Remarkably, only since 1996 private traders were allowed to become member of the VFA. The
association facilitates the following activities: the search for new export markets, the provision of
relevant market information, collaboration with Thailand to control the quality of rice and to stabilise
export prices (VFA, 2001). Their most important task was to distribute the export quota among their
members. During the last years, the VFA allocated more than 96 percent of the total rice export quota
of the country. Until 2000 all the licences were given to state owned food companies. In that year the
first private traders became member of the association and obtained an export licence: 39 state owned
food companies and 8 private traders. In order to be eligible for an export licence (quota) the following
conditions are to be fulfilled: availability of a license for rice trading, good facilities and capital for
processing and storing (at least 500 tons) and a good reputation. Formally the most important barrier
for private traders, to obtain an export licence, concerns the minimum quantity. However, in particular
in the beginning, most private traders were too hesitant to enter this business and simply did not apply
for a licence or membership. The future has to make clear to what extent the interests of the private
traders are indeed supported by the association.
In the course of time additional changes were made. In September 2000, the government decided to
eliminate the inter-regional transaction tax for rice traders2. This policy encouraged rice traders to
enlarge the scale of their business and to become more involved in inter-regional arbitrage. Also the
administrative requirements for entry into rice trading (business license) have become easier to fulfil.
At present only one registration form is required, needing approval of only one provincial office. In
Ho Chi Minh (HCM) City, the businessmen can even apply for their license by internet3. In 2000, the
Department of Trade Promotion (Viet-trade) was established in the Ministry of Trade. Among others,
the mandate of Viet-trade is to create good relationships with foreign companies and to obtain suitable
information about international markets and other consultancy services for the rice business.
3. The results: what do spatial price differences look like in the period 1998-2001?
The last Section briefly reviewed the dramatic policy changes. This raises the question how
operational the present market system is? How do prices in local markets adjust? Are these markets
integrated? Minot and Goletti (2000) analysed monthly wholesale prices and concluded that the degree
of market integration is deficient. However, a serious drawback of their study is that the analysis is not
based on day-prices or average week-prices. Average month-prices are only rough estimates of day-
prices, especially during periods of changing market conditions. Moreover, average month-prices are
not the right variables to measure the short-run price integration process. In Vietnam, day-prices are
available for only a few market places and only for a short period of time. Therefore, we use weekly
price series, from 1998 to August 2001. The analysis is based on retail price series of 25 percent
broken rice, the most popular quality in the domestic market. Nine major market places are chosen:
four retail markets are located in the Mekong River Delta (Angiang, Cantho, Soctrang, and
Tiengiang), two retail markets are located in the middle and central highlands area (Lamdong, and
Danang), and two urban retail markets (HCM City and Hanoi). Finally, the regulated export market
2 The transaction tax was levied if products were transferred to other provinces.
3 Web-site: www.HCMSTE.Gov.VN
7price (VN)4 is included in this analysis. This outlet drains the domestic surplus and concerns wholesale
transactions. The weekly price data were provided by the Cantho Trade Department, Information

















































Figure 2: Rice price series of HCM City, Danang, and Soctrang 1998 – 2001
4 The series of the VN export prices for 25% broken rice are collected from the Trade Department of Cantho
(Source: Vitranet). The price series in US dollar are converted into Vietnamese dong by using a monthly
















































Figure 4: Rice price series of HCM City, Vietnam export price, Cantho 1998-2001
The figures show the price series for nearly 4 years. Prices were not disrupted by major inflation rates5
and seem to follow the same price pattern. Price levels in the production centres in the delta are well
below retail prices in HCM City. Also prices in Hanoi are generally inferior to prices in HCM. Taking
into account that 20% of supply in the North is ‘imported’ from the Mekong River Delta and that
5 Inflation rates were very low during the period under study. Inflation rates were 5.2%, 5.2%, 5.1% and 5.3%
respectively for 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001 (www.vitranet.com.vn). Therefore we were able to use nominal
prices for this analysis.
9transport costs to Hanoi are higher than transport costs to HCM, this is remarkable. In order to get a
clear picture of what is happening a further analysis of the price differences and marketing costs
between market places is needed.
Table 1 shows that price differences between the markets in the Mekong River Delta are relatively
low. Domestic trade with HCM City gives the highest average margin. Price differences between the
Mekong River Delta and the markets in the Central Highlands of Vietnam (Lamdong) and the North
(Hanoi) are less attractive for private traders. The Table also shows a large number of negative price
Table 1: Price differences between the formal market places under study



















Number of observations (1) 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191
Average price differences (2) 511 429 315 366 399 163 100 121
Coefficient of variation (3) 0.39 0.54 0.75 0.65 0.60 0.86 1.03 0.87
Minimum price difference 0 -400 -400 -500 -1274.9 -600 -500 -500
Maximum price difference 950 1200 1250 1000 392 500 210 450
Negative price difference (4) 0.0% 4.7% 6.3% 11.0% 84.3% 65.4% 58.1% 40.3%
2. Angiang
Number of observations 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191
Average price differences 615 524 406 450 336 163 123 164
Coefficient of variation 0.37 0.48 0.60 0.59 0.66 0.86 0.89 0.90
Minimum price difference 100 -200 -50 -350 -1135.4 -500 -650 -400
Maximum price difference 1250 1300 1050 1000 484.6 600 500 700
Negative price difference 0.0% 2.6% 0.5% 7.3% 72.8% 21.5% 33.0% 27.2%
3. Soctrang
Number of observations 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191
Average price differences 585 492 377 428 345 100 123 58
Coefficient of variation 0.38 0.50 0.69 0.58 0.66 1.03 0.89 2.03
Minimum price difference 0 -200 -50 -400 -1324.9 -210 -500 -350
Maximum price difference 1250 1300 1450 1050 508.5 500 650 650
Negative price difference 0.0% 2.6% 2.6% 9.9% 80.1% 16.8% 51.3% 33.0%
4. Tiengiang
Number of observations 191 191 191 191 191 191 191 191
Average price differences 528 442 330 395 377 121 164 149
Coefficient of variation 0.42 0.58 0.63 0.72 0.64 0.87 0.90 0.79
Minimum price difference -50 -400 -350 -600 -1374.9 -450 -700 -650
Maximum price difference 1100 1200 1050 1200 325.5 500 400 350
Negative price difference 1.0% 4.2% 3.7% 12.6% 82.2% 36.1% 56.5% 53.9%
Note: (1) Number of pairs of prices observed (25% broken rice, period 1998-2001)
(2) Based on absolute differences
(3) The coefficient is calculated as follows:  −− )1/())(( 2 nxxi
(4) The percentage expresses the number of observations with a negative price.
Source: Cantho Trade Department, Information Centre of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural
Development, and the Ministry of Trade of Vietnam.
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differences between the retail markets in the delta and the export market. This seems to indicate an
inconsistency in the data. We recall that the regulated export prices (VN) concern wholesale bulky
transactions. The retail margin explains why the wholesale export price level is generally below the
retail price levels in the Mekong River Delta.
We note that the coefficient of variation for price differences in absolute values is quite high. Positive
price differences regularly become negative. Only HCM seems to be a relatively save target market:
negative price differences were not observed and the coefficient of variation is relatively low.
The estimated direct marketing costs are presented in Table 2. The costs are calculated on the basis of
data collected in the Mekong River Delta (Luu T. Duc Hai, 2003). Major determinants for the costs are
distance (transport) and the organisation of the marketing channel (use of intermediaries). The cost
structure is given for the most general marketing channel through which rice is traded between the
indicated markets. In the annex a detailed calculation is given. The costs are low for transactions
within the delta and relatively high for shipments to HCM. Most costly are transactions with Hanoi.
The percentage (Table 2) expresses the number of times the absolute price difference is larger than the
calculated marketing costs. We note that only costs are involved in the margin (no mark-up for
profits). The results show that transactions between the rural markets in the Mekong River Delta are
not attractive. Only timely transactions with Tiengiang, the commercial centre for rice in the delta, are
interesting if proper information on price differences is available. This is in line with what is observed
in the delta. The rural markets are supplied directly by assemblers coming from the villages.
Intermediate trade flows between the markets are scarce (Luu T. Duc Hai, 2003).
Table 2: Estimated direct marketing costs for transactions between the markets under study
(VND/Ton) and the number of times price differences exceed these estimations.

























































Source: Derived from Appendix 1, 2, and 3
HCM City is the most attractive destination. Price differences are normally superior to the direct
marketing costs. HCM is the centre for the export business that drains 40% of rice production.
Interestingly, private trade with Hanoi and the other markets outside the delta, are much less attractive.
This explains why private traders are not interested to supply this market in deficit periods. State
owned food companies are involved in these transfers. They are not driven by price differences but by
administrative decisions made in the framework of the national food security policy and the buffer
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stock program (Van Nguyen Trung, 1998). During our survey we did not meet any private trader in
HCM City involved in transactions with the North. Only a few private traders transfer rice from
Tiengiang to markets outside the delta: incidentally traders try to exploit temporary price differences,
or are looking in the South for a return freight in order to regain at least part of the costs for the return
trip of their truck.
We conclude that price differences are volatile. Profitable private trade is possible in particular from
rural markets in the delta to HCM City. Inter-regional price differences are less attractive for private
trade. This brings us to the question how the price series between these markets are linked. How do the
price series between markets adjust?
4. Method
In an efficient market system prices move together: “trade takes place if price in the importing region
equals price in the exporting region plus the unit transport cost incurred by moving between the two”
(Ravallion, 1986). The result of efficient trade and arbitrage activities is that prices at different market
places cohere. Cointegration analysis will allow us to verify this. The Johansen (1991) maximum
likelihood estimators test for the presence of multiple co-integrating vectors. This can be interpreted as
a test for long-run market integration. Moreover, it is possible to look for restricted versions of the co-
integrating vectors and the speed of adjustment parameters. This allows us to draw conclusions about
the short run adjustment process.
Mathematically, the starting point for a model for testing market integration based on multiple co-
integrating vectors is the following:
tptpptpttt xAxAxAxAx ε+++++= −−−−−− )1(12211  (1)
Where:
t = 1, 2,….. refer to the weeks from 1998 to August 2001
n is the number of markets included in the analysis
p is an a priori unknown integer, its value has to be determined
tx is an 1×n vector of variables ),,( ,,1 ′tnt xx  : [price of n market places]
iA is an nn× matrix of coefficients
tε is an 1×n vector of error terms
If we define 1−−=∆ ttt xxx , then equation (1) can be put in a more suitable form by replacing ktx −
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Regressing tx∆ on 11 ,, −−− ∆∆ ptt xx  and 1−tx yields an estimate for Π . In this sense the Johansen
test can be seen as a multivariate version of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test for the existence of a
unit root. If Π has full rank, then all the elements of tx are stationary, if Π is zero, they all are
integrated. In the intermediate case that Π has defective rank, its rank determines the number of
independent cointegrating relations: linear combinations of the non-stationary elements of tx , that are
stationary.
Johansen defines two matrices α andβ , both of dimension rn× , where r is the rank of Π , such
that: βα ′=Π
The matrix β is the matrix of co-integrating relations, and the matrix α is the matrix of weights with
which each co-integrating vector enters the n equations of the vector error correction model (VECM).
α can be viewed as the matrix of the speed of adjustment parameters as explained below. Due to the
cross-equation restrictions and the fact that parameters enter the model in a non-linear way, it is not
possible to estimate α and β using OLS. However, with maximum likelihood estimation, it is
possible to (i) estimate (1) as an error-correction model; (ii) determine the rank r of Π ; (iii) use the r
most significant co-integrating vectors to form β ; and (iv) select α such that βα ′=Π . The
Johansen procedure estimates the rank of Π by an iterative process, comparing the null of rank at
most r , with the alternative of rank larger than r .
The equation for a single element now takes the form
titk
k
kjijti xx .,, .... εβα ++=∆ 
where for notational simplicity, we have not written out the coefficients of the ktjx −∆ , .The linear
combinations tkkj x , β are the cointegrating relations that occur in every equation, the coefficients
ijα determine the weight that these coefficients have in the equation. Interpreting the cointegrating
relation tkkj x , β as a long term equilibrium relation, the ijα can be seen as the influence that the
deviations from the long term equilibrium have on the changes in ix : a large value for ijα shows a
strong dependence on the long-term equilibrium.
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5. Results of the test
Step 1: Testing for stationarity
Looking at the plots of the data it is clear that none of the series is stationary. We start by pre-testing
all variables to assess their order of integration by an Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test on a unit
root. Here we encounter a first problem: If we test for a unit root with intercept and trend we have to
reject the null hypothesis in most cases. But in the final VAR that we would model none of the trends
is significant. On the other hand if we test for a unit root with only an intercept all series have a unit
root.
We decided to proceed with the second alternative. In none of the cases this leads to a non-invertibility
problem that is to be expected in case of overdifferencing. Furthermore, as we will see in step 3, the
Johansen integration test only indicates a view cointegrating relations, contradicting the assumption
that all or most series are stationary.










Using the ADF test, the results presented in Table 3 indicate that the price series for the nine markets
under study are I(1). For all the price series the unit root test (with an intercept) shows that the
coefficients of xt-1 are not significantly different from zero and so none of the price series is stationary.
Furthermore, the unit root test on first differences (without an intercept) confirms the opposite, which
leads us to conclude that all series are integrated of order 1. This result implies that taking first
differences as variables in the model will eliminate the stochastic trend in the nominal series.
Table 3 Unit root test on rice price series in different market places in Vietnam
Unit root-test on price levels Unit root-test on first differencesMarket place Observations.
ADF (1) δ t-value (2) ADF (1) δ t-value (2)
Angiang (AG) 188 ADF (1) - 0.057 - 1.992 ADF (1) - 1.517 - 13.064
Cantho (CT) 187 ADF (1) - 0.032 - 1.489 ADF (0) - 1.264 - 17.944
Danang (DN) 188 ADF (1) - 0.081 - 2.81 ADF (0) - 1.109 - 15.308
HCM City 188 ADF (0) - 0.064 - 2.48 ADF (1) - 1.383 - 12.519
Hanoi (HN) 188 ADF (0) - 0.058 - 2.357 ADF (0) - 1.208 - 16.961
Lamdong (LD) 185 ADF (0) - 0.025 - 2.232 ADF (0) - 1.103 - 15.213
Soctrang (ST) 188 ADF (2) - 0.036 - 1.551 ADF (1) - 1.339 - 12.417
Tiengiang (TG) 188 ADF (2) - 0.023 - 1.025 ADF (1) - 1.560 - 13.603
VN Export 186 ADF (1) - 0.029 - 1.431 ADF (0) - 1.315 - 18.827
Note: (1) In the column ADF the number of lags that was allowed for in the unit root test is indicated in
brackets, based on the Schwartz criterion. ADF analysis was carried out in EVIEWS © 4.1
(2) Critical values are given in Maddala 1992: t = - 2.88, 5% level of significance.
Source: Weekly paddy and rice price series from 1998 to 2001. Cantho Trade Department, Information Centre
of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, and the Ministry of Trade of Vietnam.
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The plots of the data give some indications that it is wise to test for the existence of volatility
clustering. If we model each series by an appropriate ARMA process the quadratic residuals exhibit no
serial correlation. If we fit a Garch model the Schwartz criterion is higher than in case of a simple
ARMA model. So we conclude that there is no significant clustering effect in the volatility.
Step 2: Testing for the lag length
We continue to test for the lag length, because the results of co-integration tests can be quite sensitive
to this. An obvious procedure is to estimate a vector auto-regression (VAR) on the differenced series.
Start with the longest lag length deemed reasonable and test whether the lag length can be shortened.
We use the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Schwarz criterion (SC) to select a suitable lag
length. The VAR analysis on first differences shows that the smallest value for both AIC and SC is
obtained with lag length 1 (See Appendix 4). The result of the VAR analysis is presented in Table 4
below.
Table 4 VAR analysis on rice price series in different market places
∆VN(-1) ∆HCM(-1) ∆CT(-1) ∆LD(-1) ∆TG(-1) ∆HN(-1) ∆ST(-1) ∆AG(-1) ∆DN(-1)
∆VN - 0.304
[-4.327]


































- - - -
∆HN - 0.158
[2.067]
- - - -0.299
[-3.068]
- - -










∆DN - - - 0.129
[2.070]
- - - - -0.178
[-2.406]
Note: The results of the VAR analysis are based on one lag (the AIC and SC are smallest).
All figures in parenthesis […] are t-values, non significant values are omitted
In general, Table 4 indicates that the present price changes in all market places are highly correlated
with their own price change in the previous period. The results in the first column indicate that the
price changes in most major rice markets in the Mekong River Delta and HCM City are strongly
related to changes in the export price.
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Step 3: Determine the number of cointegrating equations
The main task in this step is to determine the rank of Π in (2) and to estimate the co-integrating
equations. The results of λtrace and λmax , using the Johansen co-integration test available in EVIEWS
(Table 5), indicate that the rank of Π is 3 (for both the λtrace and λmax tests at 95% significant level)6.
Table 5 Testing for the number of cointegrating relations























































Note: If the value of λtrace and or λmax exceeds the critical value, we reject the null hypothesis and accept the
alternative of more co-integrating vectors.
Step 4: Testing for long-run price integration
We focus on the long-run co-integration of price series by analysing the normalised co-integrating
coefficients (β ). To estimate co-integrating coefficients ( β ) we use the Johansen co-integration test
as implemented in EVIEWS. The co-integrating coefficients β estimated in step 2, r = 3 are
presented in Appendix 5. If we normalise with respect to the export price of Vietnam (VN), the prices
in HCM City (HCM), and in Cantho (CT), the three normalised co-integrating equations are as
follows:
VN = + 3.598 AG – 3.243 ST + 4.250 TG – 3.568 LD – 0.265 DN + 0.497 HN (1)
[-4.387]** [3.804]** [-5.751]** [6.557]*** [0.727] ns [-1.084] ns
HCM = – 1.879 AG + 0.069 ST + 1.266 TG + 0.420 LD + 0.324 DN + 0.734 HN (2)
[5.425]** [0.193] ns [-4.057]** [-1.829]* [-2.099 [3.787]*
CT = – 0.766 AG + 1.136 ST + 0.231 TG + 0.306 LD + 0.115 DN – 0.055 HN (3)
[6.501]*** [-9.276]*** [-2.175]* [-3.911]** [-2.187]* [0.846] ns
Note: All figures in parenthesis […] are t-values;
*** = significant at 1%, ** = significant at 5%, * = significant at 10%, ns = not significant.
6 Because if we select r ≥ 4 then the λtrace and λmax value are smaller than the 95% critical value (54.09<59.46 for
λtrace and 34.82<36.36 for λmax)
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The significant coefficients in the co-integrating equations (1) and (2) above indicate that in the long-
run most markets in the Mekong River Delta are highly co-integrated with HCM City and especially
with the export price of Vietnam. Rice is a major export product for the Mekong River Delta.
Therefore, the price formation process in this region highly depends on the government controlled
export price. Moreover, HCM City is the major urban centre in the South of Vietnam and, therefore, it
was expected to be strongly integrated with the major grain baskets in the South. Two market places,
located in the Centre and the North of Vietnam: Danang and Hanoi, are not significantly present in the
co-integrating equation (1). This result may be explained by the fact that these markets are no major
surplus areas but urban consumer centres. As expected, these markets are related to the price levels
observed in HCM City. However, the relationship is somewhat weak. This can be explained by the
subsidies used in the framework of the food security policy and the long distance (high marketing
costs). Furthermore, co-integrating equation (3) shows that all markets in the Mekong River Delta are
highly co-integrated. This result clearly indicates that the rice market system in the South is strongly
integrated.
Step 5: Testing for short-run integration with a Vector Error Correction Model
When long-run integration is observed, it can be incorporated in the model, by specifying a Vector
Error Correction Model (VECM). This VECM can then be used to estimate the dynamics in the short-
run. Using the same price series as in step 3 we obtain the results presented in Appendix 6. The short-
run dynamics are presented in Table 6. The numbers presented are the coefficients of the cointegrating
relations in the regression for the price changes.
Table 6 Estimate the dynamics in the short-run by using VECM
Er.
Correction
D(VN) D(HCM) D(CT) D(AG) D(ST) D(TG) D(LD) D(DN) D(HN)
CointEq1 -0.019593 -0.029363 -0.028046 0.012855 0.008991 0.065214 -0.055013 -0.013811 -0.018373
(0.01899) (0.01610) (0.01378) (0.01723) (0.01497) (0.01483) (0.01840) (0.01530) (0.01593)
[-1.03156] [-1.82387] [-2.03566] [ 0.74624] [ 0.60044] [ 4.39619] [-2.99045] [-0.90256] [-1.15367]
CointEq2 0.015752 -0.004872 0.076943 -0.165163 -0.078770 0.036218 -0.018738 0.046136 0.118912
(0.04449) (0.03771) (0.03227) (0.04035) (0.03507) (0.03474) (0.04309) (0.03584) (0.03730)
[ 0.35409] [-0.12921] [ 2.38446] [-4.09353] [-2.24607] [ 1.04241] [-0.43488] [ 1.28725] [ 3.18788]
CointEq3 -0.154306 -0.000200 -0.266788 0.101853 0.415107 0.317987 0.181434 0.048756 -0.067354
(0.13002) (0.11021) (0.09431) (0.11793) (0.10250) (0.10155) (0.12593) (0.10475) (0.10902)
[-1.18677] [-0.00182] [-2.82872] [ 0.86370] [ 4.04976] [ 3.13133] [ 1.44071] [ 0.46543] [-0.61780]
Note: All figures in parenthesis […] are t-values
Table 6 shows that the four major rice production markets in the Mekong River Delta: Cantho (CT),
Angiang (AG), Soctrang (ST) and Tiengiang (TG) strongly react on the long-run co-integrating
equations. The partial short-run adjustment of price changes at those market places reacts significantly
on the deviation from the long-run equilibrium. Tiengiang is the strongest follower of the co-
integrating equation (1) and Angiang is the strongest follower of the co-integrating equation (2), as
measured by the coefficients: 0.065214 and 0.165163 for Tiengiang and Angiang respectively. In the
co-integrating equation (3) Tiengiang and Soctrang have a stronger reaction than the others (0.415107
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and 0.317987). Finally, the Cantho rice market is a special market, as it reacts on all of the three co-
integrating equations.
The price changes in the domestic market do not have any measurable influence on the export price:
the coefficients of all three cointegrating relations are not significant. Apparently, rice traders in
Vietnam have to follow the price set by the Vietnamese government for transactions in the
international market. The market of Lamdong (LD), in the Central Highlands, reacts on the
cointegrating equation (1), although the significant coefficient is quite low. Prices in Hanoi strongly
react on cointegrating relation (2). The market of Danang is the most weakly integrated market.
6. Conclusions
This study analysed the spatial price differences in the rice market of Vietnam in order to understand
its functioning. Since 1988 a domestic liberal trade policy is implemented to improve the incentives in
the agricultural sector. We observed that price differences are quite volatile, but profitable domestic
trade is possible, in particular with HCM City.
The results of market integration analysis showed that all market places under study are integrated in
the long run. However, the degree of market integration differs among the markets. In general we
observe that the prices between HCM City and the markets in the Mekong River Delta strongly
cohere, even in the short run. The other markets are integrated in the long run but the relationship in
the short run is relatively weak. The long distance (transport costs and other marketing costs) explains
part of this result. Another explanation is found in government policies regarding food security and the
buffer stock program. The inter-regional transactions operated by the SOEs are based on
administrative prices and subsidies. The upshot is that private trade between the North and the South is
not profitable and that the price adjustment process between these regions is sluggish. Interestingly, no
evidence was found that price differences between the South and the North are regularly larger than
the marketing costs (Goletti and Minot, 2000). This shows that the system fulfils the key condition for
an economically integrated market, that maximum regional price differences are determined by
marketing costs.
The price changes in the domestic market do not have any measurable influence on the export price,
even though Vietnam is the world's second largest exporter of rice. This shows that the regulated
world market price dominates the domestic price formation process. This was expected as the Mekong
River Delta is selling 40% of its rice production on this market. An interesting question, requiring
further research, is the relationship between the government policy that fixes the export price and price
patterns on the world market.
The data support the view that the domestic rice market in Vietnam is highly competitive. However,
rice trade between the North and the South is determined by administrative prices making private trade
between these regions unprofitable. We also observed that private traders obtained only a very small
18
percentage of the total export quota. This crucial segment in the rice market is still controlled by state
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Appendix 1: Average direct marketing costs to deliver rice from major market places in the
Mekong River Delta to HCM City
(Unit: VND/Ton)





































2. Brokers in HCM City (3) (commission
fee: offering of parking area, negotiation
and other selling services)
60,000 60,000 60,000 60,000
3. Wholesalers in HCM City (4)
Labour costs
Transportation




























Total 419,000 466,000 445,000 355,000
Note: (1) The estimation of transportation costs for long-distance assemblers is based on the distance between
the markets and the results of the survey carried out by Luu T. Duc Hai (2003).
(2) Other costs for long-distance assemblers included losses in quantity and quality of rice;
accommodation (e.g. food and drinks); parking fees; extra payments for loading and unloading.
(3) Of which 50% concerns a commission fee and 50% a payment for provided services (derived from
rice brokers in Tiengiang and based on the standard of living/salary in HCM City).
(4) These figures are computed based on the results of a survey among wholesalers in the MKD
provinces and the standard of living/salary in HCM City.
(5) Other costs for wholesalers concern the depreciation on fixed assets, interest on borrowed capital,
losses in quantity and quality of rice.
Source: Estimates derived from Luu T. Duc Hai, 2003
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Appendix 2: Average direct marketing costs to deliver rice from Cantho to other provinces in the
central highlands and in the north
(Unit: VND/Ton)






1. Long-distance assemblers by boat (1)




















2. Brokers in Tiengiang market place (3) (commission
fee: offering of parking area, negotiation and other
selling services)
20,000 20,000 20,000
3. Long-distance assemblers by truck (4)




















4. Wholesalers of other provinces (5)
Labour costs
Transportation





















Total 374,000 509,000 661,000
Note: (1) These figures are derived from Luu T. Duc Hai’s survey
(2) Other costs for long-distance assemblers include losses in quantity and quality of rice;
accommodation (e.g. food and drinks); parking fees; extra payments for loading and unloading.
(3) Of which 50% is a commission fee and 50% concerns a payment for services.
(4) Transportation costs for long-distance assemblers (truck) are based on the distances between markets.
(5) Estimations are based on the results of a survey among wholesalers in the MKD provinces and the
standard of living/salary in Lamdong, Danang, and Hanoi.
(6) Other costs for wholesalers concern the depreciation of fixed assets, interest on borrowed capital,
losses in quantity and quality of rice.
Source: Estimates derived from Luu T. Duc Hai, 2003
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Appendix 3: Average direct marketing costs for transactions between major market places in the
Mekong River Delta.
(Unit: VND/Ton)




































































































Total 161,500 161,500 175,000 169,000 189,000 189,000
Note: (1) These figures are derived from Hai’s survey and based on the distance between different market
places.
(2) Other costs for distance assemblers include losses in quantity and quality of rice; accommodation
(e.g. food and drinks); parking fees; extra payments for loading and unloading.
(3) Other costs for wholesalers concern the depreciation on fixed assets, interest on borrowed capital,
losses in quantity and quality of rice.
Source: Luu T. Duc Hai, 2003
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